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International and Canadian Law Rules




Cyber attacks, also called computer network attacks, are one of the greatest
threats to international peace and security and global economic prosperity given
their potentially catastrophic consequences. Canada and the United States of
America are particularly vulnerable to cyber attacks as they depend on a large
bandwidth running through their respective societies. In the absence of a global
agreement on the legal nature of cyber attacks, a majority of states are “leveraging
the Internet for political, military, and economic espionage activities”.1 As a result,
cyber attacks have become one of the hottest topics in international law.
When carrying out a cyber attack, state or non state hackers use “logic
bombs”2 and “trap doors” also called “Trojan horses”3 to place virtual explosives
in computers. Thus, laptops can replace bombs and bullets and become potential
* Hons BA in international development, with distinction, U of Western Ontario;
Certificate of International Affairs and Multilateral Governance, Geneva Graduate
Institute of International Law and Development Studies; BCL/LLB candidate, teaching
assistant, Faculty of Law, McGill University, Montreal; student at Fasken Martineau
Dumoulin LLP, Montreal.
1 McAfee, Virtual Criminology Report (2008), in J Carr, Inside Cyber Warfare: Map-
ping the Cyber Underworld (Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly Media Inc, 2009) at 1.
2 A software application or a series of information that causes a system or network to
shut down or erase all data or software on the network.
3 Hackers add unauthorized software to a program to enter into a network or software
program. After entry, they leave behind a trapdoor into the million lines of a computer
code running, for instance, an air defense program to facilitate access to it. The trap-
door could be instructions on how to respond to certain circumstances or a program
that would cause all the computers on the network subject of the attack to crash and be
unable to reboot. Preprogramming the flood of Internet traffic to crash or jam the net-
work (called Distributed Denial of Service-DDOS) has already occurred on a number
of occasions domestically and internationally. Attacking computers are called botnets
or zombies under remote control thus following instructions loaded into them by state
or non-state actors without the knowledge of their owners, sometimes months before
the attack when the owners went to a webpage or opened an email as nothing appears
on their screens. The botnets/zombies may also spread the infection to other computers
which in turn do the same. This is called a worm which may quickly infect millions of
originating computers around the world. The botnets/zombies distribute the attack over
these computers acting in unison. Note that malicious software like viruses, worms,
logic bombs, trapdoors, phishing scams (tricking an Internet user to provide informa-
tion), etc are called malware.
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weapons of mass destruction since hackers can “key in” devastation. For instance,
within fifteen minutes a sophisticated or terrorist cyber attack against the United
States or Canada could shut down all the systems of the U.S. Air Route Traffic
Control Centers or the Area Control Centers of NAV Canada, wipe out all the fi-
nancial data in the financial computer centers of New York or Toronto, provoke a
nation-wide blackout, cause train derailments or damage nuclear plants, etc. In
other words, the attack would bring the United States or Canada to a standstill caus-
ing millions of its citizens to perish and major other industrial and economic
damage.4
Deterrence is not very effective to control cyber attacks due to their nature, the
speed at which they move, the difficulty in tracking them reliably and the fear of
the asymmetrical effects that retaliation could have on North American networks
due to their vulnerability. Other means must be found to prevent such attacks or
respond to them.
This essay, which contains a broad ranging overview of several important is-
sues raised by the recent number of cyber attacks in Canada and elsewhere, begins
with a definition of cyberspace and cyber war. It is followed by a brief survey of
some cyber attacks that have occurred in Canada and elsewhere in recent years. The
first part addresses the question whether present rules of international law applica-
ble to armed attacks using kinetic weapons apply to the wide notion of cyber at-
tacks by a state actor against the government and critical civilian infrastructures of
another state and concludes that they do. However, some grey zones still exist
which need to be clarified. Not all cyber attacks are of the same gravity and present
international law rules were adopted before the age of the Internet. Today, states
that are more dependent on highly advanced technology are subject to greater risks
and in turn demand greater protective measures.
The last part of the essay is concerned with cyber attacks as cyber crimes
when carried out by non-state actors, mostly from a Canadian law point of view.
The conclusion lists a number of proposals to address the present dangers
posed by cyber attacks on the international and Canadian levels.
I. DEFINITION OF CYBER-SPACE AND CYBER WAR
Cyberspace is an electronic terrain that does not occupy any physical space.
However, it is submitted that the borderless nature of cyberspace should not pre-
vent states from exercising jurisdiction over a cyber attack and its actor since ulti-
mately a cyber attack will control physical processes. The fact that cyberspace is
everywhere there is a computer or a processor or a cable connecting to one means
that physical space cannot be ignored. The perpetrator and the target of a cyber
attack, whether a state or an individual or entity, will frequently be located in one
state and the effects of such an attack may be felt on the territory of another state.
In other words: “territoriality still turns out to be a prime factor; apparently cyber-
4 J Markoff et al, “In Digital Combat, U.S. Finds No Easy Deterrent”, New York Times
(25 January 2010) online: <http://nytimes.com/2010/01/26/world/26cyber.html?d
pagewanted=all>.
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space is not considered so a-territorial after all.”5
In the United States, a Bill entitled Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset
Act6 defined cyberspace as follows: 
The term “cyberspace” means the interdependent network of information
infrastructure, and includes the Internet, telecommunications networks,
computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers in critical
industries.
This is a definition which includes physical processes that take place or may
have an effect within the territory of a particular state, be it the actor or the target of
a cyber attack. Cyberspace is not limited to a state’s jurisdiction over its territory
and its citizens. Thus, it would seem that, in the international context, physical
space is still relevant in the case of a cyber attack, especially with respect to the
location of the originating actor and where the effects on the targeted state are felt.7
The Internet is a medium used by individuals located in physical space to commu-
nicate to individuals also located in physical space. Since the Internet traffic often
travels through a number of servers located in foreign physical space, the integrated
and global nature of this traffic increases the potential for multiple domestic or
foreign jurisdictions claiming control over it on the basis of the territorial principle.
On the international level, cyber war has been defined as “the art and science
of fighting without fighting and defeating an opponent without spilling blood.”8 It
takes the form of a cyber attack, an act by the organs or agents of a state which, by
using different types of malware, penetrates the computers, networks or websites of
another state, to affect negatively the political, military or economic situation ex-
isting in that other state even if it is not preceded or accompanied by military force.
Its purpose is to cause damage or destruction.
This type of cyber attack does not fit exactly the traditional description of the
use of force or an act of war which is “a hostile contention by means of armed
forces, carried on between nation states”,9 using kinetic weapons. However, re-
5 Bert-Jaap Koops & Susan Brenner, Cybercrime and Jurisdiction: A Global Survey
(The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2006) at 6. Also JL Goldsmith, “The Internet and the
Abiding Significance of territorial Sovereignty” (1998) 5 Ind J Global Stu 475.
6 2010, S 3480, s 3 Definitions (3). This bill never became law. See also the definition
given by R A Clarke & R K Knake, Cyber War (New York: Harper — Collins, 2010)
at 70: “Cyberspace is all of the computer networks in the world and everything they
connect and control. It includes the Internet plus lots of other networks of computers
that are supposed to be accessible from the Internet.” Placing a logic bomb on the
computers of your enemy in cyberspace is like placing a physical bomb on the physical
territory of this enemy.
7 See below, III(c) Attribution of Conduct to a State.
8 Carr, supra note 1 at 2. See also the more technical definition given by Clarke &
Knake, supra note 6: “Cyber warfare is the unauthorized penetration by, on behalf of,
or in support of, a government into another nation’s computer or network, or any other
activity affecting a computer system, in which the purpose is to add, alter, or falsify
data, or cause the disruption of or damage to a computer, or network device, or the
objects a computer system controls.”
9 Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed (St Paul, Minn: West Corp, 1991) at 1583, “war” italics
added.
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cently, the U.S. Government decided to categorize a cyber attack as an act of war
enabling the president to consider imposing economic sanctions, resorting to cyber-
retaliation and even, as a last resort, ordering a military strike against the actor state
if key U.S. computer systems were attacked. According to the U.S. Department of
Defence, without question, some activities conducted in cyberspace could consti-
tute a use of force and may well involve a state’s inherent right to lawful self-
defence.”10
When the author of the attack is a private individual or entity or a terrorist
group using networks, computers, and applications to cause, for instance, a “Dis-
tributed Denial of Service,” it would not be appropriate to call the cyber attack an
act of war. The response would have to be different.
II. RECENT HISTORY OF CYBER ATTACKS
Cyber attacks as a form of non-conventional weaponry are of recent origin. In
1991, when the war against Iraq began, the United States and its allies used the
Internet to reach and demoralize Iraqi officers and soldiers and instruct them how
to surrender before the conventional attack by the United States air force. This can
be considered to be one of the first instances of cyber warfare, akin to the sending
10 Department of Defense Cyberspace Policy Report, A Report to Congress pursuant to
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Section 934, November
2011, at 9, at para 12, online: <http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/
0411_cyberstrategy/docs/NDAA%20Section%20934%20Report_For%20webpage
.pdf>. Also President Obama’s National Security Strategy (17 May 2010), online:
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.
pdf>; The U.S. position was to some extent established by NATO at the November
2010 Lisbon Summit: <http://www.nato.int/Lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-
eng.pdf>; U.S. International Strategy for Cyber Space (May 2011), online:
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for
_cyberspace.pdf>; U.S. Department of Defense, Strategy for Operating in Cyber-Space
(July 2011), online: <http://www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf>, which pro-
poses five strategic initiatives to operate effectively in cyberspace, defend national in-
terests and achieve national security objectives. Note that in March 2011, before the
NATO-led strikes against Libya, the Obama administration considered whether to be-
gin intervention in support of the rebels by a cyber attack to disrupt and disable the
Quaddafi government air defense system. After an intense debate, it was decided to
reject cyber warfare for fear of setting a precedent for other nations especially Russia
and China. See E Schmitt & T Shanker, “U.S. Debated Cyberwarfare in Attack Plan on
Libya”, New York Times (17 October 2011), online:
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/18/world/africa/cyber-warfare-against-libya-was-
debated-by-us.html>. Eventually, the U.S. will have to cross the threshold into overt
cyber attacks to defend vital government, military and public infrastructure networks.
Also T Shanker, “U.S. Weighs Its Strategy on Warfare in Cyberspace”, New York
Times (18 October 2011), online: <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/19/world/
africa/united-states-weighs-cyberwarfare-strategy.html>. Presently, there are no spe-
cific rules of engagement to guide individual digital operations. Defensive missions
might cross the line into offensive actions when applied to the digital domain. This
does not mean that active defense is offensive in cyberspace. An active defense in
cyberspace seeks to identify and even neutralize threats before they materialize.
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of propaganda radio messages or dropping leaflets in World War II.
In 2007, the Israeli air force destroyed a nuclear facility being built in Syria by
North Koreans, on the ground that its purpose was to produce weapons of mass
destruction eventually to be used against Israel. The attack was successful in spite
of a state of the art air defence radar and missile system built by the Russians.
Having hacked into the Syrian defense system and disabled it using light and elec-
tric pulses to transmit and control what these radars saw, the Israeli planes were
able to penetrate Syrian airspace undetected. In this case, the cyber attack was fol-
lowed by a conventional military attack using kinetic weapons.
Another example of the use of cyberspace for political objectives but without
the use of military force was the case of Estonia which, in 2007, had moved the
bronze statue of a Soviet soldier commemorating the liberation of the country in
1945. This move prompted hackers to attack the servers supporting the most used
web pages in Estonia by flooding them with simple access requests, thereby col-
lapsing or shutting them down. Access to online banking websites or other elec-
tronic services like servers running the telephone network became impossible. The
attack lasted for weeks. This “Distributed Denial of Service” attack instantly be-
came a major weapon in the cyber arsenal. Eventually, the attackers were traced to
Russia, although this state denied that it was engaged in a cyber war against Estonia
and maintained that the attack was done by individual Russian nationalists who
were incensed by the act of Estonia. As a result, in 2008 NATO opened a Cyber
Defense Center of Excellence in Estonia to deal with cyber wars.
The same year, on the occasion of the invasion of the Republic of Georgia by
Russia, cyber attacks took place against Georgian media outlets and government
websites. As a result Georgians could not connect to any outside news or send or
receive emails. Again, Russia denied that the cyber attacks were the work of its
official agents.
In 2009, North Korea sent a coded message to about 40,000 computers around
the world which became infected with a botnet virus. The message instructed the
computers to ping a number of U.S. and South Korean government websites and
international companies. With the zombie computers joining the attack, these sites
became flooded with requests to see their pages and eventually these attacks re-
sulted in another “Distributed Denial of Service.” In the United States, sites of the
Treasury, the Secret Service, the Federal Trade Commission, the NASDAQ, and
the New York Stock Exchange, among others, were hit. Eventually, more than
160,000 computers in 74 countries attacked South Korean banks, government agen-
cies and other vulnerable sites. The attacker did not attempt to control any govern-
ment system or essential services. North Korea denied being the author of these
cyber attacks. Even if North Korea was directly involved, it is debatable whether
such attacks could be considered as acts of war as psychological pressure and
threats are made every day in international relations between hostile states.
In June 2010, a computer worm called STUXNET was configured in such a
way as to specifically make uranium enriching centrifuges in Iran spin out of con-
trol and shut down.11 This was a covert cyber operation designed, perpetrated or
11 The STUXNET worm moved from computer to computer via Windows security vul-
nerability allowing it to infect computers not normally connected to the Internet. It
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sponsored allegedly by Israel and the United States of America in order to
destabilize Iran’s controversial nuclear enrichment program. A similar attack took
place again in 2011 using a different worm.
In the winter and spring 2011, there were several separate cyber attacks
against Canadian government ministries such as the Treasury Board of Canada Sec-
retariat and the Department of Finance, Canadian law firms involved in a foreign
attempt to take over Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan and the U.S. defense con-
tractor Lockheed Martin, apparently originating from hackers in China or Russia.
In 2009, as a result of a cyber attack against the computers of the U.S. Military
Central Command, a United States Cyber Command was created by the Depart-
ment of Defense as a sub-unified command of the U.S. Strategic Command with
the mission to use information technology and the Internet as a weapon and also to
defend the Department of Defense.12 The Department of Homeland Security de-
fends other parts of the federal government. Although this may change as a result
of the new U.S. National Security Strategy, so far no federal agency is charged with
the defense of the power grid, the banking system or the transportation networks
from a cyber attack on the ground that it is the responsibility of the private sector to
do so. Other states like Russia,13 China,14 North Korea,15 France16 and Israel17
also created cyber warfare commands. The Canadian military lacks a formal Cyber
Command although at the present Communications Security Establishment Canada,
a division of the Department of National Defense monitors international Internet
communications to protect Canada’s electronic network. In 2010, the Canadian
Government launched Canada’s Cyber Security Strategy designed to protect from
hackers certain Canadian assets like the power grid and government departments.18
disabled 10% of the centrifuges. John Markoff, “Malware Aimed at Iran Hit Five Sites,
Report Says”, New York Times (11 February 2011), online:
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/13/science/13stuxnet.html>. Also Matt Liebowitz,
“Stuxnet Clone ‘Duqu’ Possibly Preparing Power Plant Attacks”, (18 October 2011),
online: <http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2011/10/18/stuxnet-clone-found-possibly-
preparing-power-plant-attacks/>.
12 See online: <http://enwikipedia.org/wiki/united_ states_cyber_command>.
13 A Russian Cyber Command, online: <ieexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?
arnumber=5954699-Similar>.
14 Cyber warfare units created by China are responsible for offense and defense in cyber-
space. Among the many weapons and techniques used, are information mines and logic
bombs, changing network data, establishing network spy stations to monitor Internet
traffic, degrading and shutting down computer and critical foreign infrastructure sys-
tems. Hacking against United States, European and Japanese industries and research
facilities is also another activity pursued diligently by the Chinese government.
15 Note that Unit 121 of the [North] Korean People’s Army Joint Chiefs Cyber Warfare
specializes in destabilizing South Korea’ Military Command Control and Communica-
tion Network. It operates mostly from China because the few North Korea Internet
connections can easily be identified.
16 Online: <www.intelligenceonline.com/. . ./cyber-command-for-french-military.91
319142-ART-Similar>.
17 Online: <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0.7340.L-4070561>.
18 See online: <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/cbr-scc-eng.pdf>.
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In May 2011, the U.S. Government prepared an international cyber defense
strategy, which is not limited to a cyber-response. All necessary means as appropri-
ate and consistent with applicable international law would be used to respond to
hostile acts in cyberspace, especially with respect to cyber attacks that threaten
widespread civilian casualties.19
The infrastructures of a state subject to a cyber attack usually involve its mili-
tary, transportation system, electric energy, gas and oil storage and delivery, bank-
ing and financial sector services, water supplies, telecommunications, and emer-
gency services. These infrastructures are particularly vulnerable to a cyber attack,
given their reliance on integrated computer technologies.20 Most destructive, would
be the initiating of a nuclear catastrophe by a hacker attack, especially by a terror-
ist, on nuclear power plants or on the command and control of nuclear weapons.
III. CYBER ATTACK BY A STATE ACTOR AGAINST
GOVERNMENT OR CRITICAL CIVILIAN INFRASTRUC-
TURES OF ANOTHER STATE WITHOUT PRECEDING OR
ACCOMPANYING USE OF KINETIC FORCE
(a) Cyber Attack by a State as a Use of Force which Amounts to a
Breach of the Peace or an Act of Aggression
Is a cyber attack by an organ or agent of a state or its sponsored terrorist or-
ganization, not preceded or accompanied by the use of kinetic force in the physical
world, an act prohibited by international law (e.g. the Charter of the United Na-
tions, the 1974 Definition of Aggression by the General Assembly of the United
Nations,21 the 2010 amendment to the Statute of the International Criminal Court
which now defines aggression,22 and the 1970 United Nations Declaration on Prin-
19 Supra note 10. Also supra note 10, Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in
Cyberspace (July 2011). In the USA see two competing bills in the Senate namely the
Cybersecurity Act of 2012, s. 2105 introduced Feb. 14, 2012,
<http://www.govtrack.us/comngress/bills/112/s2105> and the SECURE IT Act of 2012,
introduced March 1, 2012, <http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2012
/3/senators-introduce-legislation-to-strengthen-cybersecurity>. Both bills are designed
to buttress the networks for critical US infrastructures, such as electrical power plants
and nuclear reactors.
20 In Canada see Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness
created in 2001 and originally located with the Department of National Defense and
now integrated within the Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada portfolio
which is part of the Department of Public Safety, online:
<http://circ.jmellon.com/agencies/ocipep/>. Thus, in Canada public safety covering
cyber attacks comes primarily within the jurisdiction of the Department of Public
Safety in cooperation with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Royal Cana-
dian Mounted Police, and the Canada Border Services Agency. The Department of Jus-
tice Canada and the Department of National Defense are also involved in their respec-
tive sphere of jurisdiction.
21 UNGA Res 3314 (XXIX), (14 December 1974), 13 ILM 710.
22 UN Doc A/CONF 183 /9, 17 July 1998. Art 8 bis, adopted in Kampala on 11 June
2010, Resolution RC/Res 6. Depositary Notification CN 651.2010, Treaties -6, dated
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ciples of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations).23
Some of these instruments can be relied upon to prohibit cyber attacks.
For this purpose, let us assume that the actor of the cyber attack is an organ or
an agent of a state that has been identified and that the attack has caused the bank-
ing system to grind to a halt or disrupted the transportation system or electrical grid
of the targeted state, creating chaos and endangering its economy.
Article 2.3 of the Charter of the United Nations lays down the principle that:
“All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.” This
obligation is reinforced by article 2.4 which declares that: “All Members shall re-
frain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the terri-
torial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner incon-
sistent with the purposes of the United Nations.” Interpreting article 2.4 liberally,
especially the words “restrain . . . from the . . . use of force against the . . . political
independence of any state . . .”, it would seem that the disruption of the transporta-
tion system or the electrical grid, or stopping the banking system of the targeted
state would certainly affect its political independence by endangering its economic
and financial stability, leaving that state’ government at the mercy of other states.
On the other hand, a narrow interpretation of the same words would require that the
cyber attack be preceded or accompanied by a physical attack with kinetic weap-
ons. Since in the past the Charter of the United Nations has been concerned with
conventional warfare, it is unlikely that many of its members would agree that a
cyber attack is a “use of force” of a kinetic nature. However, the words “refrain . . .
from the use of force . . . in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations” could be interpreted to include a cyber attack without the physical
component of the use of force especially if one considers article 1.1 of the Charter,
which deals with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. In the context
of a cyber attack, these principles are the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace and the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace.
Also, a cyber attack does not “develop friendly relations among nations” as re-
quired by article 1.2.
Furthermore, in determining whether the Charter of the United Nations applies
to the threat or use of non-conventional weapons of mass destruction, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on The Legality of the Threat or Use
of Nuclear Weapons, indicated that articles 2.4, 51 and 42 of the Charter of the
United Nations do not refer to specific weapons. They apply to any use of force
regardless of the weapons used. Thus it could be argued that since “the Charter
neither expressly prohibits, nor permits the use of any specific weapon”,24 cyber
attacks by computers are covered by the words “use of force”, “armed attack” or
29 November 2010, available online: <http://treaties.un.org>. The amendment will
come into force one year after ratification by 30 states parties to the Court which will
be able to exercise jurisdiction on this ground at the earliest only after 1 January 2017.
23 UNGA Res 2635 (XXV) UN GAOR 25th Sess, Supp No 28 at 121. UN Doc A/8028
(1971) adopted by consensus on 24 October 1970.
24 [1996] ICJ Rep 226, at para. 39.
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“act of aggression”.
Article 39 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter which gives the Se-
curity Council the task of determining “the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and making recommendations or decid-
ing what measures must be taken to maintain or restore international peace and
security can be interpreted as applying to a cyber attack. Such an attack would be a
breach of the peace and even an act of aggression, particularly if one considers the
collateral damage which could result from such an attack.
In order to characterize a cyber attack as an act of aggression, one must ex-
amine how the international community has defined an “act of aggression”. In one
of its Resolutions adopted in 1974, the United Nations General Assembly25 defined
aggression in article 1 as “. . . the use of armed force by a State against the sover-
eignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this
Definition.” Reference is made to “armed force” in the physical sense. It is consis-
tent with the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations which states that
“armed force shall not be used, except in the common interest.” This reference to
armed force would prevent the characterization of a cyber attack as an act of ag-
gression unless preceded or accompanied by physical force. If that were the case,
the use of a cyber attack would fall within the traditional scope of jus in bello.
Article 2 of the Definition also refers to the “first use of armed force”. Article
3 gives a long list of acts which, regardless of a declaration of war, qualify as an act
of aggression. All the acts listed in paragraphs (a) to (g) of article 3 describe physi-
cal attacks by “armed forces”, which would further eliminate a cyber attack from
the definition of aggression. Yet, article 4 leaves the door open to extending this
definition to include cyber attacks since it declares that: “The acts enumerated
above are not exhaustive and the Security Council may determine that other acts
constitute aggression under the provisions of the Charter.”
The Statute of the International Criminal Court26 listed the crime of aggres-
sion in article 5.1(d) but did not define it in 1998 when the Court was created.
However, in 2010, article 8 bis was added to this statute which now defines the
crime of aggression as 
the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military ac-
tion of a state, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and
scale constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.
Paragraph 2 of the new article then defines an “act of aggression” as 
the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity
or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsis-
tent with the Charter of the United Nations. . . .
This is followed by a list of acts of aggression similar to those described in
article 3 of the 1974 Resolution. Crimes of aggression will only be prosecuted after
25 Supra note 21. For a comprehensive analysis and comments by the Canadian Delega-
tion see JG Castel, International Law, Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada,
3d ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 1976) at 57–63.
26 Supra note 22.
98   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [10 C.J.L.T.]
the Security Council has made a determination that an act of aggression has been
committed. In article 8, which covers war crimes and contains a long list of these
crimes, reference is always to a physical “armed force” which would rule out a
cyber attack. Thus, articles 8 bis and 8 do not comfortably apply to cyber attacks.
The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Re-
lations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations27 was drafted in a pre-computer age. Reference is made to the “use
of force” against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations, repeating
what appears in article 2.4 of the Charter of the United Nations.
To conclude, the most important international text provisions that support the
view that a cyber attack by a state is a “use of force” that is a threat to the peace, a
breach of the peace or an act of aggression that gives jurisdiction to the Security
Council to apply the measures found in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations are articles 2.4 and 39 et seq. of the Charter. However, whether a cyber
attack could be considered a violation of the Charter would depend upon its char-
acter, gravity and scale. Not all cyber attacks would qualify.
To put this matter to rest the Security Council could add cyber attacks to the
list of acts of aggression in article 3 of the 1974 Definition of Aggression.
(b) International Law of State Responsibility for Internationally
Wrongful Acts
Another possible avenue for holding a state responsible for a cyber attack that
is not preceded or accompanied by the use of kinetic force is the customary interna-
tional law of state responsibility that “Every internationally wrongful act of a State
entails the international responsibility of that State.”28
According to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility “There is an interna-
tionally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission
(a) is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) constitutes a breach
of an international obligation of the State.”29 Depending on the context, a cyber
attack by the organ or agent of a state, or by a terrorist organization sponsored by a
state, may amount to a breach of the international obligations that states have not to
harm one another.30 That obligation attracts the state’s international responsibility,
as for instance in the case of a “Distributed Denial of Service.”
To remedy this situation, the targeted state would be able to resort to self-help
measures, such as reprisals,31 distinct from those listed in Chapter VII of the Char-
ter, which would not be applicable in the absence of proof that the attack amounted
to the “use of force”, an “armed attack”, or an act of aggression. However, the state
27 Supra note 23.
28 Art 1, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Re-
port of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 53rd Sess, UNGAOR,
56th Sess, No 10 UN Doc A/56/10 [Draft Articles on State Responsibility].
29 Ibid art 2.
30 Corfu Channel Case, United Kingdom v Albania (Merits), [1949] ICJ Rep 4 at 2224.
31 Below, V(f) Reprisals — Countermeasures.
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responsible for the cyber attack would be under an obligation to: “(a) cease that act,
if it is continuing; and (b) to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-
repetition, if circumstances so require”,32 and to compensate the targeted state for
the damages caused thereby.33
(c) Attribution of Conduct to a State
To hold a state responsible for a cyber attack it is necessary to determine
where the attack originated. The clandestine nature of cyberspace makes this diffi-
cult, especially when the cyber attack is conducted through intermediate computer
systems to disguise the identity of the attacker. The more an attacker routes the
attack through intermediary systems, the more difficult it is to trace the attacker’s
identity.34 Yet, the identification of the attacker state is a legal requirement before
the targeted state can decide how to respond.
Can a cyber attack using local or foreign servers be attributed to the state
when the attack is carried out by government organs, by others who have acted
under the direction, instigation or control of these organs as agents of the state, by a
terrorist organization or by an individual terrorist sponsored or tolerated by that
state? A state is responsible for its organs or agents acting as hackers provided that
they have that status under the domestic law of that state.35 To trigger the interna-
tional responsibility of the state, the cyber attack must result from the active partici-
pation of these organs or agents under cover of their official character. However,
the state cannot invoke an excess of authority by its organs or agents to block a
claim by the state targeted by the cyber attack.36
A state that has sponsored or tolerated a cyber attack by a terrorist organiza-
tion or an individual terrorist may violate article 2.4 of the Charter37 if the attack
meets the threshold for the use of force. It would also violate conventions dealing
32 Supra note 28 at art 30.
33 Ibid art 36.
34 Trace back software can be used to find the origin of the attack. However, some servers
may not co-operate. If that is the case, hacking into these servers could help unless the
actor directed the attack from a server located in another state which could be that of
the target!
35 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 28 arts 4-5.
36 Ibid art 7.
37 See UNSC Res 748 (1992), 31 March 1992, UN Doc S/RES/748 involving Libya and
the aerial incidents at Lockerbie and in Niger (1992), 31 ILM 717: “The Security
Council . . . Reaffirming that, in accordance with the principle in Article 2, paragraph 4
of the Charter of the United Nations, every State has the duty to refrain from organiz-
ing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiesc-
ing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such
acts, when such acts involve a threat or use of force.” Since on several occasions, the
members of the Security Council have expressed their deep concern over acts of inter-
national terrorism and emphasized the need for the international community to deal
effectively with all such acts, they would probably be prepared to condemn a state
sponsoring a cyber attack by a terrorist organization. UNSC Res 1373, para 2, 28 Sep-
tember 2001, UN Doc S/RES/1373.
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with terrorism and the customary international law rule that a state has a duty “not
to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other
states.”38 Furthermore, according to paragraph 1 of the Declaration of Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States
in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,39
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or
participating in . . . terrorist acts in another State nor acquiescing in organ-
ized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such
acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or
use of force.
It is doubtful that an act of cyber terrorism could also be an act of aggression
under article 3(g) of the 1974 Definition of Aggression40 and article 8 bis 2(g) of
the Statute of the International Criminal Court.41 Although these rules and princi-
ples were adopted before the advent of the Internet, they should be extended to
include this type of cyber terrorism. Targeted states would then be able to respond
in self-defence.
The conduct of the terrorist organization will be attributed to the state sponsor-
ing or tolerating it if “the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instruc-
tions of, or under the direction or control of that State.”42 The degree of control
required in order for the cyber attack to be imputable to the state is that of effective
control over the terrorist organization, which may not often be the case.43 In
Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic44 the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
held on appeal that where a state has a role in organizing, coordinating and provid-
ing support for a group, it has sufficient overall control for the acts of the group to
be attributable to the state.
States that have not sponsored terrorists involved in a cyber attack against the
targeted state, but are hosting them, may become sanctuary states by failing to track
them down and prevent further attacks.45 Is this sufficient to make the sanctuary
38 Corfu Channel Case, supra note 30 at 22.
39 Supra note 23.
40 Supra note 21.
41 Supra note 22.
42 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 28 art 8.
43 Military Activities In and Against Nicaragua, Nicaragua v United States of America
(Merits), [1986] ICJ Rep 14 at paras 113–115 [Military Activities in and against Nica-
ragua] where the issue was whether the acts of the Contras could be imputed to the
United States of America. D Jinks, “State Responsibility for the Acts of Private Armed
Groups” (2003), 4 Chicago J Int’l L 83.
44 IT-94-1-A,; (1999), 38 ILM 1518 at 1541, at para. 117.
45 See UNGA Res 55/63, UN Doc A/RES/55/63, 22 January 2001. UNSC Res 1368 at
para 3, UN Doc S/RES/1368, 12 September 2001; UNSC Res 1373, UN Doc
S/RES/1373, 28 September 2001. Responsibility of the Taliban when they were in
power for harboring and protecting Al Qaeda for their conduct with respect to 9/11.
Note that Bill C-10 tabled in the House of Commons of the Canadian Parliament on 20
September 2011 and entitled the Safe Streets and Communities Act, contains in Part I
the Justice for the Victims of Terrorism Act, ss 4–9, which, when passed by the Senate
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state a legitimate target of action taken by the victim state in self-defence as was
the case with the invasion of Afghanistan by the U.S. after 9/11? First, it would be
necessary to establish the gravity of the conduct in order to determine whether an
“armed attack” took place against the targeted state. If so, could the conduct of the
terrorists be attributed to the host state or, in the alternative, could the host state be
responsible for failing to have prevented such attack? The host state would have to
be substantially involved in the attack to be held responsible.46
(d) Resort to Self-Defense
According to article 51 of the Charter: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security . . .47
For the targeted state to resort to self-defence, the cyber attack by a state actor
would have to be characterized as an “armed attack”. There is no definition of an
“armed attack” in any provision of the Charter or other international document.
However, it is generally accepted that the use of force is an “armed attack” when it
is of sufficient scope, duration and intensity.48 Does a cyber attack qualify as a “use
of force” similar to an armed attack? The 1974 Definition of Aggression49 requires
the first use of force and its consequences to be of “sufficient gravity” before it is
considered an “armed attack”. An unconventional use of force like a cyber attack
could be considered equivalent to an “armed attack” when its scope, duration and
intensity are of sufficient gravity. Several approaches can be used for this purpose:
(2d reading and in Committee at the time of writing), is designed to deter terrorism by
creating a cause of action that “allows victims of terrorism to sue their perpetrators and
their supporters” (s 3). This legislation will cover states supporting terrorists involved
in cyber attacks. For this purpose, the proposed Act amends the State Immunity Act
(RSC 1985 c S-18) to prevent a foreign state from claiming immunity of jurisdiction
when being sued in Canada by a victim of terrorism arising from actions that are re-
lated to the support of terrorism. Will this legislation violate international law rules
pertaining to immunity of states? Such a suit will also raise some interesting issues of
private international law.
46 Military Activities In and Against Nicaragua, supra note 43 at para 195.
47 Note that art 21 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 28, declares
that: “The wrongfulness of an act of a State is precluded if the act constitutes a lawful
measure of self-defence taken in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.”
48 It has been suggested that six criteria define an “armed attack”, namely severity, imme-
diacy, directness, invasiveness, measurability and presumptive immediacy. See M
Schmitt, “Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law” (1999)
37 Colum J Transnat’l L 885 at 913–15.
49 Supra note 21 art 2. However, see US Letter to the President of the UN Security Coun-
cil (7 October 2001) UN Doc S/2001/946 with respect to action against the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan after 9/11: The armed attack need not emanate from another
state to give rise to a right of self-defense. See also Legal Consequences of the Con-
struction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, (9 July 2004) Advisory
Opinion, ICJ Rep 136.
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whether the damage caused by a cyber attack previously could have been achieved
only with a physical attack (instrument based approach); whether the cyber attack
had an overall disruptive effect on the victim state (effects based approach); and,
automatically treating a cyber attack on infrastructures as an “armed attack” (strict
liability approach). The effects based approach takes the others into account.50 If in
certain circumstances the US categorization of a serious cyber attack by a state
actor as an act of war is accepted by the international community, it would be a
“use of force” similar to a traditional “armed attack”, which could justify acts of
self-defence including a kinetic response on the part of the targeted state.51 Further-
more, since the provisions of the Charter “do not refer to specific weapons, they
apply to any use of force regardless of the weapons employed”.52 A computer used
to carry out a cyber attack is a weapon that makes an attack an “armed attack”.
(e) Pre-emptive Self-Defence
Article 51 is limited in its extent, but the existence of a right to resort to pre-
emptive self-defence independently from the Charter has been recognized by cus-
tomary international law and used on a number of occasions. It is based on the
inherent and natural right of a state to self-preservation in the face of a serious and
imminent threat to its national security.53 As opposed to article 51 no actual “armed
attack” has to take place before pre-emptive self-defence can be used. In the 2003
invasion of Iraq, the United States of America went a step further and argued that a
state can act in preventive or anticipatory self-defence against not just an immedi-
ate proximate threat but even against a non-imminent or non-proximate, but still
real threat, especially in case of sponsored terrorism. According to JG Castel, the
“concept of imminent threat relevant to pre-emptive self-defense had to be adapted
to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.”54 Thus, when a state is
expecting a cyber attack or an armed attack even in the distant future, it could re-
sort immediately to measures of self-defence to remove the potential future threat.
The recent cyber attacks against Iranian nuclear installations, allegedly by Israel
and the United States of America, to prevent a potential Iranian nuclear kinetic
50 Carr, supra note 1 at 59.
51 Supra note 10. See Department of Defense Cyberspace Policy Report, supra note 10 at
paras 11, 12: “Without question, some activities conducted in cyberspace could consti-
tute a use of force, and may well invoke a state’s inherent right to lawful self defense.”
52 The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 24 at para 39. See
also discussion in Section V(a) below.
53 See the Caroline Case, United Kingdom v United States of America, 2 Moore’s Digest
of International Law 409 at 412, preventive action in a foreign territory is justified only
in case of “an instant and overwhelming necessity or self-defence, leaving no choice of
means and no moment of deliberation.” See also Military and Paramilitary Activities
In and Against Nicaragua, supra note 40 at paras 102-103.
54 JG Castel, “The Legality and Legitimacy of Unilateral Intervention in an Age of Ter-
ror, Neo-Imperialism, and Massive Violations of Human Rights: Is International Law
Evolving in the Right Direction?” (2004), 42 Can YB Int’l L 3 at 13. See also A More
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, 29 November 2004, UN Doc A/59/565, at
paras 188–194.
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attack on Israel, is a case in point. Yet, since Iran is a party to the Treaty on the Non
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 196855, suspicion of the production of nuclear
weapons may not justify disrupting its nuclear program by a cyber attack.56 How-
ever, if it is widely accepted by the international community so as to become cus-
tomary international law, the concept of non-proximate threat could justify the al-
leged Israel/U.S. cyber attack against Iran in spite of the 19 June 1981 Security
Council Resolution condemning Israel for its armed attack on the Iraqi Nuclear
Research Centre.57
Self-defence against a cyber attack may take the form of active self-defences
such as a counter cyber attack on the infrastructures of the attacking state or elec-
tronic countermeasures designed to strike attacking computer systems and shut
down cyber attacks mid-stream. Passive self-defences to defend computer networks
such as system access or data controls, security administration and a secure systems
design are not measures of self-defence stricto sensu, since they do not breach the
normal prohibition against the use of force.
The difficulty is attributing to a particular state or its agents a cyber attack in
progress in order to respond with active defences. To qualify as legitimate self-
defence the response to a cyber attack must meet the criteria of necessity, propor-
tionality and immediacy.58
In light of the recent U.S. categorization of cyber attacks as acts of war and the
declaration that, depending upon the circumstances, military means using kinetic
weapons may be used as self-defence to respond to such attacks, the first “armed”
attack by the U.S. in response to a cyber attack would not “constitute prima facie
evidence of an act of aggression” as prohibited by article 2 of the 1970 Definition
of Aggression.59
(f) Reprisals — Countermeasures
Reprisals, also called countermeasures, which are taken by a state whose
rights have been violated by another state, are unlawful but may be justified if they
meet certain conditions. If a cyber attack falls short of the “armed attack” threshold
required for the application of article 51 of the Charter, the targeted state can still
55 729 UNTS 161, (1968), 7 ILM 811, 1970 CanTS 1970 No 7.
56 In a non-cyber attack context see UNSecurity Council Resolution 487 (19 June 1981)
UN SCOR, 36th Year Res and Docs 10, UN Doc S/INF/37 (1982), which unanimously
condemned the military attack by Israel on the Iraqi Nuclear Research Centre as in
clear violation of the Charter of the United nations and the norms of international con-
duct. See also Security Council Debate (12 June 1981), UN Doc, S/PV 2280, reprinted
in (1981) 20 ILM 965. Iraq was a party to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nu-
clear Weapons, supra note 55.
57 Ibid. Also Memorandum from the Legal Bureau of the Department of External Affairs
(27 November 1981), (1982), 20 Can YB Int’l L 303.
58 See Military Activities In and Against Nicaragua, supra note 43 at paras 96-97. Note
this case also analyzes the concept of collective self defense mentioned in art 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations; Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use
of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 24 at 822.
59 Supra note 21.
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resort to countermeasures against the state which launched the attack.60 However,
prior to taking countermeasures, the targeted state must have asked the actor of the
cyber attack to discontinue the attack or make reparation and the actor must have
failed to do so.61 This is unrealistic due to the nature and speed of a cyber attack.
The countermeasures must also be proportionate to the gravity of the attack and
could include the use of a limited cyber counter-attack although it need not mirror
the initial violation.62 Finally, the countermeasures cannot be of a military nature as
they would constitute a violation of articles 2.4 and 51 of the Charter.63
(g) Conduct of Cyber War
What would be the legal consequences if a cyber attack, as an act of cyber war
by a state actor, were to be considered equivalent to the “use of force”, the use of
“armed force” or “an armed attack” in physical space allowing the targeted state to
use kinetic weapons in response? In 1907 at The Hague, it was agreed that “the
right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.”64 Sev-
eral more recent international conventions may also be relevant as a model for ban-
ning cyber war. For instance, the 1980 Convention on Prohibition or Restriction on
the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons and Protocols65 which serves as an um-
brella for protocols dealing with specific weapons, such as mines, could be the ob-
ject of a new protocol dealing with cyber attacks. The Geneva Conventions for the
Protection of War Victims of 1949, especially Convention IV Relative to the Pro-
tection of Civilian Persons in Time of War66 and the Additional Protocols I67 and
II68 to this Convention adopted in 1977, and some articles of the Statute of the
International Criminal Court of 199869 could also be relevant.
If a cyber attack is considered to be an act of war, a state using kinetic force in
response has to respect the jus in bello principles of distinction, humanity, necessity
and proportionality. These principles require that a distinction be made by the bel-
ligerents between the civilian population and combatants and only the latter are
60 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 28 art 49.
61 Ibid art 52.
62 Ibid art 50.1(a).
63 Ibid art 50. See also Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations, supra note 23.
64 Hague Convention No IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and An-
nex (Regulations), (18 October 1907) US Stat 2277, 1 Bevans 631.
65 See online: <http://www.un.org/millennium/law/xxvi-18-19.htm> and
<http://treaties.un.org/doc/publications/UNTS/volume%202041/v.2041.pdf>. See also
the Hague Convention No IV, supra note 64.
66 (1950), 75 UNTS 287.
67 (1977), 1125 UNTS 3. Note that art 36 requires a state adopting or developing a new
weapon first to determine whether or not it is prohibited by international law. At pre-
sent, methods of cyber attacks are not prohibited unless they fit within existing interna-
tional conventions. Therefore, it is unlikely that a laptop is a prohibited weapon.
68 (1977), 1125 UNTS 609.
69 UN Doc A/CONF/183/9, 17 July 1998, arts 5–8.
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targeted. The proportionality test weighs the use of force against the possibility of
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof. The use of weapons designed to cause unnecessary suffering
is also prohibited. The amount of force to be used against a legitimate target is
limited to the amount necessary to accomplish a valid military objective. The use of
force must not be “excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advan-
tage anticipated”70 These limitations arise if the use of force can harm civilians.
The use of kinetic weapons to respond to a cyber attack is dangerous and non-
effective as well as capable of causing disproportionate collateral damage. It would
be better to respond by active defenses such as tracking the attack back to its source
immediately and disrupting it.71 This raises the issue of whether computers are le-
gitimate military objectives. To date cyber attacks have not been considered part of
the traditional conduct of war in physical space. However, in light of the new U.S.
cyber defence international strategy, a traditional military response to a cyber at-
tack using kinetic weapons should be launched only as a last resort72 as a matter of
policy rather than a legal limitation. A state that has sustained an armed attack is
entitled to respond with a use of force, including kinetic and other weapons, pro-
vided they are not prohibited by international law. The United States has recog-
nized that “Cyberspace’s unique aspects may require clarification in certain ar-
eas.”73 This is particularly true with respect to the law of armed conflict.
(h) Electronic Espionage
Spying through hacking without authorization into the networks, computers or
data bases of a foreign state or a non-state enterprise to collect sensitive informa-
tion to which access is denied without adding or altering data, damaging or dis-
rupting the networks or things the networks control in physical space is difficult, if
not impossible, to detect when it is done by a state organ that has the means to
cover its tracks. This kind of espionage is cheaper, more successful and has fewer
consequences than traditional espionage and is not prohibited by international law,
although it may be punished by the domestic law of the targeted state.74 It becomes
an international wrong when those who spy upload software packages such as logic
bombs to damage or destroy the network they spy upon.
Most of the cyber spying by state organs targets technological information and
especially intellectual property rights protected by international conventions. This
type of espionage should qualify as an international cyber crime for which the act-
ing state should be held responsible. On the international level it would be most
difficult to reach an agreement to limit or ban electronic espionage and enforce
such a ban.
70 Additional Protocol I, supra note 67 art 51(5)(b).
71 Carr, supra note 1 at 72.
72 Department of Defense Cyberspace Policy Report, supra note 10.
73 Ibid at 7-8 paras 9-10.
74 In Canada, see Security of Information Act, RSC 1985, c O-5 as am, especially eco-
nomic espionage, s 19.
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(i) The Birth of a New International Customary Law?
The decision by the United States of America in 2011 to categorize a cyber
attack by a state as an act of war75 equivalent to a traditional “armed” attack, the
“use of force” or an act of aggression, if accepted and followed by other states
could evolve into a new international customary law applicable to cyberspace. This
categorization would overcome the present difficulty arising from the fact that the
Charter and other relevant international instruments were adopted before the age of
the computer and are concerned with armed conflict using kinetic weapons in phys-
ical space not cyber weapons in cyberspace. In view of the seriousness of the issue,
and until such categorization meets the criteria of constant usage and acceptance as
a matter of law (opinio juris), which could take place within a relatively short pe-
riod of time, individual states should be able to act outside existing categorizations
and be justified when responding to cyber attacks on the ground of self-defence
outside the Charter.76 Yet, this may not be necessary if one accepts the declaration
by the U.S. in the International Strategy for Cyberspace document that: “Consistent
with the United Nations Charter, states have an inherent right to self-defence that
may be triggered by certain aggressive acts in cyberspace.”77 This implies that any
such aggressive act amounts to an “armed attack” within the meaning of article 51
of the Charter. The exponential increase of cyber attacks and their potential cata-
strophic consequences for the international community require quick action to ad-
dress this threat. By categorizing such attacks as acts of war, many states and their
organs will hesitate to resort to them especially against the infrastructures of other
states. The response would have to respect the principles of jus in bello and particu-
larly the proportionality requirement.
75 Supra note 10.
76 See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] ICJ Rep 3; Military Activities In and
Against Nicaragua, supra note 43 at paras 94–106; Restatement of the Law Third, For-
eign Relations Law of the United States, (St Paul, Minn: American Law Institute Pub-
lishers, 1987) s 102(2). In the context of International Humanitarian Law, see J-M
Henchaerts & L Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 2 vols
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) and MM Casagrande et al, Canadian
Red Cross, delivered at the International Conference on Customary International Hu-
manitarian Law: challenges, practices and debates, Montreal, Panel 1; Origin and con-
clusions of the IRRC study on customary international humanitarian law (29, 30 Sep-
tember & 1 October 2005). It could be argued that until a formal international
instrument condemns cyber attacks by a state against the civil infrastructures of another
state, by analogy to the Martens clause introduced into the preamble of the 1899 Hague
Convention II on the Laws and Customs of War, see online:
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martens_Clause> and included in the 1907 Hague Con-
ventions, civilian population should remain under the “protection and empire of inter-
national law as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from
the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience”, which for the
purpose of establishing a custom banning these attacks would not insist on the require-
ment of constant usage but emphasize opinio juris. See A Cassese, “The Martens
Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky” (2000) 11 JIL 187.
77 Supra note 10 at 10, Basic Norms.
INTL. & CANADIAN RULES APPLICABLE TO CYBER ATTACKS   107
IV. CYBER ATTACK AS A CYBERCRIME BY A NON-STATE
ACTOR
(a) Responsibility of States for Cyber Attacks by Non-State Actors
It is well established that: “Ordinarily, a state is not responsible for acts by
individuals or other private entities.”78 However, even if a state is not involved
directly or indirectly in a cyber attack, it has certain obligations towards the
targeted state. There is a duty on its part to prevent such hostile action by private
parties when originating from servers and actors located within its physical bounda-
ries. This duty includes preventing the cyber attack and, if that is too late or impos-
sible, attempting to identify the actors, and bringing to justice all those who tried to
disrupt or damage the systems of the targeted state. This duty finds support in the
general customary international law of state responsibility79 which holds that: 
In general, a state is responsible for inaction when it fails to carry out some
international obligation to act, whether an obligation assumed by interna-
tional agreement, or one imposed by customary law.80
The existence of this custom has been acknowledged on a number of occa-
sions. For instance, in the Steamship Lotus, France v Turkey case, Judge John Bas-
set, in a dissenting opinion on another issue, declared that “a state is bound to use
due diligence to prevent the commission within its dominions of criminal acts
against another state.”81 It also finds support in the Corfu Channel case, where the
International Court of Justice held that a state has a duty “not to allow knowingly
its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states.”82 In the U.S.
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran case, the International Court of Justice
reiterated that states are required under international law to take appropriate mea-
sures to protect the interests of other states from non-state actors within their
territory.83
Where the target is not a foreign state but a foreign private individual or en-
tity: “In addition to liability for failure to take appropriate steps to prevent harm to
a foreign national, a state may be liable for failure to take steps to punish a viola-
tion of such rights.”84 A state cannot avoid liability simply by declaring that the
cyber attack is the act of a private party in its territory. The private target, for in-
stance, Visa, in a case of a “Distributed Denial of Service,” or a private utility in
the case of a cyber attack on its grid, should be able to obtain damages not only
from the hacker but also from the state that did nothing to prevent or control such
78 Restatement of the Law Third, Foreign Relation of the United States, supra note 76, s
207, Comment c at 97.
79 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 28 art 2, omission.
80 Restatement of the Law Third, Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 76, s
207, Reporter’s Notes, 5 State inaction at 99. Also, 1970 Declaration on Principles of
Friendly Relations, supra note 23.
81 1927 PCIJ (Ser A) No10 at 88.
82 Supra note 30 at 22-23.
83 [1980] ICJ Rep 3 at 32-33, 44.
84 Restatement of the Law Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United States, supra note
78 s 207, Reporters’ Notes, 5 State inaction at 99.
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attack.
(b) 2001 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime
This Convention85 which entered into force in July 2004 lays down guidelines
for all states wishing to adopt legislation against crimes committed via the Internet
and other computer networks and to foster international co-operation. It is not con-
cerned with cyber war conducted by the organs or agents of a state. Canada, al-
though not a member of the Council of Europe, signed the Convention on 23 No-
vember 2001 and is planning to ratify it as soon as Parliament has adopted
legislation implementing all of its provisions.86 With respect to the subject matter
of this essay, the Convention is important to the extent that it covers cyber attacks
on computers and computer networks by non-state actors including terrorists.
Article 1 of the Convention contains definitions of ‘computer system’, ‘com-
puter data’, ‘service provider’ and ‘traffic data’, wide enough to cover further tech-
nical developments.
According to article 2 of the Convention: 
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be neces-
sary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when commit-
ted intentionally, the access to the whole or any part of a computer system
without right. A Party may require that the offence be committed by infring-
ing security measures, with the intent of obtaining computer data or other
dishonest intent, or in relation to a computer system that is connected to
another computer system.
Legislative and other measures to be adopted by the parties cover the intercep-
tion made by technical means of non-public transmissions of computer data from or
within a computer system, including electromagnetic emissions from a computer
system carrying such computer data;87 the damaging, deletion, deterioration, altera-
tion or suppression of computer data;88 the serious hindering of the functioning of a
computer system by inputting, transmitting, damaging, deleting, deteriorating, al-
tering or suppressing computer data;89 and, the production, sale, procurement for
use, import, distribution or otherwise making available a device designed or
85 Council of Europe, CETS No 185, (2001) 41 ILM 282 and Additional Protocol not
directly related to cyber attacks, CETS No 189, 2003. For an analysis see the Explana-
tory Report, online: <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/html/185.htm> and
Mike Keyser, “The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime” (2003) 12 J Trans-
nat’l L & Pol’y 287 and RJ Currie, International & Transnational Criminal Law (To-
ronto: Irwin Law Inc, 2010) at 392–405.
86 Not ratified as of February 2012. The Convention was ratified the Senate of the US in
2006. For a criticism of the Convention on the ground that it gives too much power to
investigative authorities and force Internet providers to respond to foreign evidence
orders, see M Goodwin, “Watch Out. An International Treaty on Cybercrime Sounds
Like a Great Idea Until You Read the Fine Print”, (April 2001), online:
<http://cryptome.org/cycrime-goodwin.htm>.
87 Supra note 85, art 3.
88 Ibid art 4.
89 Ibid art 5.
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adapted for the purpose of committing any of the offenses just described against the
confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems.90 For crim-
inality to attach, the illegal access and interception, data interference, system inter-
ference and misuse of devices must be committed intentionally and without right.
For instance, in the case of illegal interception, the act is justified if the intercepting
person “acts on the instructions or authorization of the participants of the transmis-
sion. . .or if surveillance is lawfully authorized in the interests of national security
or the detection of offences by investigating authorities”.91
The list of offenses signatories are required to incorporate in their domestic
law also includes offences related to the infringements of copyright and related
rights.92
Articles 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 would cover espionage, especially industrial espio-
nage, since it involves illegal access, illegal interception, data and system interfer-
ence as well as misuse of devices.
In Canada, everyone who fraudulently and without color of right uses a com-
puter service or system “is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprison-
ment for a term not exceeding ten years or is guilty of an offence punishable on
summary conviction.”93 The Criminal Code contains a number of useful defini-
tions including: ‘computer programs’, ‘computer service’, ‘computer system’,
‘function’, ‘intercept’ and ‘traffic’. Most relevant is the definition of data as “repre-
sentations of information or of concepts that are being prepared or have been pre-
pared in a form suitable for use in a computer system.”94
Section 430(1.1) of the Criminal Code, which covers mischief in relation to
data, is most important. It provides that: 
Every one commits mischief who willfully
(a) destroys or alters, data;
(b) renders data meaningless, useless or ineffective;
(c) obstructs, interrupts or interferes with the lawful use of data;
or
(d) obstructs, interrupts or interferes with any person in the law-
ful use of data or denies access to data to any person who is enti-
tled to access thereto.
As in the case of the unauthorized use of a computer, the author of the mis-
chief in relation to data: “(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to impris-
onment for a term not exceeding ten years; or (b) is guilty of an offence punishable
on summary conviction.”95 Data has the same meaning as in section 342.1(2) of the
90 Ibid art 6.
91 Explanatory Report, supra note 85 at para 58.
92 Supra note 85, art 10. See also arts 7-8 on computer related offences not relevant to
cyber attacks.
93 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 as am, s 342.1(1).
94 Ibid s 342.1(2). See also s 342.2 (1), possession of device to obtain computer service
and s 191(1), possession, sale or purchase of a device for surreptitiously intercepting
private communications.
95 Ibid s 430(5).
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Criminal Code dealing with the unauthorized use of a computer.96
Sections 342.1 and 430(1.1) of the Criminal Code are adequate to sanction the
authors of cyber attacks who spread and attempt to spread computer viruses and
other malware designed to deny Internet services, shut down all computers or wipe
out any type of data, provided of course that they can be identified and brought to
justice. They cover the substantive provisions of the Cybercrime Convention. Al-
though these provisions have no extraterritorial effect, they would apply to foreign
hackers provided the effects of their nefarious attacks were felt in Canada.
Articles 23 to 35 of the Convention on Cybercrime deal with co-operation and
mutual assistance to the widest extent possible for the purpose of investigations or
proceedings concerning criminal offences related to computer systems and data, or
for the collection of evidence in electronic form of a criminal offence. The Conven-
tion also creates an obligation to give law enforcement authorities the power to
compel Internet Service Providers to monitor a person’s online activities.97
In Canada, the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act98 provides
for the implementation of treaties for mutual legal assistance in criminal matters.
Part I covers the situation where Canada is the requested state. It deals with the
authority and procedure for responding to a request by a foreign state or entity that
is a party to such treaty or has entered into an administrative arrangement for legal
assistance with Canada covering foreign investigations or other proceedings.99
Such legal assistance pertains to search and seizure,100 the gathering of evidence
for use abroad,101 and the lending of exhibits.102 Part II deals with the situation
where Canada is the requesting state. It lays down rules for the admissibility in
Canada of evidence, especially foreign records, obtained abroad pursuant to an
agreement.103 Finally, Part III also addresses various issues arising when Canada
has made a request to a foreign state such as the special authorization given to a
96 Ibid s 430(8). Note that Bill C-51 introduced in Parliament by the Minister of Public
Safety on 1 November 2010, intended to amend the Criminal Code, the Competition
Act and the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (Investigative Powers for the
21st Century Act), in clause 10 would have made it illegal to possess a computer virus
for the purpose of committing mischief and also made it an offense to import or make
available a computer virus. It died on the order paper but will probably revived during
the 41st session of Parliament.
97 Supra note 85, art 20. In Canada Bill C-52 entitled Investigating and Preventing Crimi-
nal Electronic Communications Act, which was introduced on 1 November 2010 in the
House of Commons but died on the order paper, would have required telecommunica-
tions service providers to put in place and maintain certain capabilities allowing for the
interception of information transmitted by telecommunications.
98 RSC 1985, c 30 (4th Supp) as am. For a detailed analysis see Department of Justice of
Canada, The Federal Prosecution Service, Desk Book, Part VIII International Assis-
tance Chapter 43, see online: <http://www.ppsc.gc.ca/eng/fps-sfp/fpd/ch43.html>.
99 Ibid, s 8.
100 Ibid, ss 10–16.
101 Ibid, ss 17–23.
102 Ibid, ss 30–34.
103 Ibid, ss 36–39.
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person in a foreign state or entity who is not admissible under Canadian immigra-
tion rules to come to Canada to a designated place and for a limited period of time
for the purpose of giving evidence in a proceeding or to give assistance in relation
to an investigation or proceeding.104 It further provides that records sent by a for-
eign state or entity in accordance with a Canadian request are privileged.105
From the point of view of cyber attacks and other cyber crimes, Parts II and III
are particularly important when the attack originated outside Canada in a state party
to an agreement providing for mutual assistance in criminal matters. However, the
Canadian legislation will have to be amended to comply with the provisions of the
Convention on Cybercrime dealing with procedural enforcement tools.
To be a “hacktivist” for fun or malicious purposes does not give that person a
right or a license to hack into networks and disrupt or damage them. Probably, all
types of hacking constitute a violation of some international or national law, or
both, even if the hacker assuming the role of the network administrator or author-
ized user does not do anything harmful.106 It should also be noted that the Conven-
tion on Cybercrime requires the parties to it to take the measures necessary to en-
sure that a legal person can be held liable where the lack of supervision or control
by a natural person has made possible the commission of a criminal offence estab-
lished in accordance with its provisions.107
To fully implement the Convention, Canada must adopt more cyber specific
criminal offences and give the police more power to conduct Internet surveillance
in order to investigate cyber crimes. New legislation to that effect is pending before
Parliament and it will probably include previous Bills.108
(c) Terrorists
A number of multilateral international conventions have been adopted that
seek to prevent and punish different types of terrorist acts such as, inter alia, hi-
jacking and other attacks on civil aviation including airports, the taking of hostages,
attacking maritime vessels and fixed platforms on the continental shelf.109 States
parties to these conventions have agreed to amend their domestic criminal law to
provide for wide bases of jurisdiction over these terrorist acts and either to extradite
or prosecute their alleged perpetrators. Canada has implemented these conventions
in its Criminal Code.110
104 Ibid, ss 40-41.
105 Ibid, s 44.
106 With the exception of espionage at international law or where a state has not criminal-
ized the gaining of unauthorized access to someone else’s computer system.
107 Supra note 85, art 12.2.
108 See supra notes 45, 96, 97. Some states which are vulnerable to cyber attacks may not
be prepared to face this issue for lack of adequate resources or a willingness to do so.
This attitude would hinder cooperation with Canada.
109 For a list see the Canadian Criminal Code, supra note 93, s 83.01(1) (Definition of
“terrorist activity”).
110 Ibid, ss 83.01–83.33. See also offences committed in or outside Canada also connected
to terrorism: ss 7(1) (aircraft), 7(2.2) (fixed platforms), 7(2.31) (space stations), 7(3)
(internationally protected persons), 7(3.1) (hostage taking), 7(3.2) (nuclear material),
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The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism,111 the Declara-
tion on Principles of Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,112 the 1994 Declara-
tion on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism113 and the 1996 Declara-
tion on Strengthening International Security114 also contain important provisions
dealing with terrorism.
In Canada, the Criminal Code would cover cyber attacks by terrorists.115 For
instance, such attacks come within the scope of section 83.01(1)(b) of the Criminal
Code which defines “terrorist activity” as 
an act or omission, in or outside Canada,
(i) that is committed
(A) in whole or in part for a political, religious or ide-
ological purpose, objective or cause, and
(B) in whole or in part with the intention of intimidat-
ing the public, or a segment of the public, with regard
to its security, including its economic security, or
compelling a person, a government or a domestic or
an international organization to do or to refrain from
doing any act, whether the public or the person, gov-
ernment or organization is inside or outside Canada,
and
(ii) that intentionally
(A) causes death or serious bodily harm to a person
by the use of violence,
(B) endangers a person’s life,
(C) causes a serious risk to the health or safety of the
7(3.71) (UN personnel), 7(3.73) (financing terrorism), 7 (3.72) and 431.2 (explosives
or other lethal devices), 7(3.74) (terrorism offence committed outside Canada), 7(3.75)
(terrorist activity committed outside Canada), 76 (hijacking), 77 (endangering aircraft
or airport), 78 (offensive weapons and explosive substances), 78.1 (seizing control of
ship or fixed platform). See also Bill C-10, Safe Streets and Communities Act, Part I,
Justice for the Victims of Terrorism Act, supra note 45.
111 27 January 1977, ETS No 97. However, art 1 does not cover cyber attacks.
112 Supra note 23.
113 UNGA Res A/RES/49/60 (9 December 1994). Also UNSC Res 1189, (13 August1998)
and UNSC Res 1373 (2001), UN Doc S/RES/1373 (28 September 2001).
114 UN Res 51/151 (13 December 1996).
115 Criminal Code, supra note 93, ss 83.01-83.33 and 7(3.74) (terrorism offence commit-
ted outside Canada), 7(3.75) (terrorist activity committed outside Canada). In the US
see The Patriot Act (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act), 2001 as am, Title VIII, Strengthening
the Criminal Laws Against Terrorism, s 814 (deterrence and prevention of cyber terror-
ism), 18 USC s 1030(a)(5) and (e) (2) (definition of “protected computer”). See also
Proposal for an International Convention on Cyber Crime and Terrorism, definition of
“cyber terrorism”, art1.2, online: <http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/11912
/sofaergoodman.pdf> at 26.
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public or any segment of the public,
(D) causes substantial property damage, whether to
public or private property, if causing such damage is
likely to result in the conduct or harm referred to in
any of clauses (A) to (C), or
(E) causes serious interference with or serious disrup-
tion of an essential service, facility or system, whether
public or private, other than as a result of advocacy,
protest, dissent or stoppage of work that is not in-
tended to result in the conduct or harm referred to in
any of clauses (A) to (C).
Harboring or concealing a person whom he or she knows to be a terrorist for
the purpose of enabling that person to facilitate or carry out any terrorist activity is
guilty of an indictable offence.116 This would also include a cyber attack.
Until there is a quasi-universal condemnation of cyber crimes and a wide
adoption of the European Convention on Cybercrime, it is not possible to affirm
that such crimes give all states universal jurisdiction to punish its non-state perpe-
trators as is the case with piracy.
(d) Prescriptive Jurisdiction over Cyber Offences
The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime in article 22.1 lists two of
the traditional bases upon which a party may found claims to prescriptive jurisdic-
tion over cyber offences. The first is the territorial principle which gives jurisdic-
tion to the state in whose territory the offence is committed.117 This includes its
territory, ships flying its flag and aircraft registered therein.118 The Convention
does not take any position on the scope of the territorial principle. Does it mean
exclusively the place where the offending act was commenced (subjective or initia-
tory principle), or where the act was consummated or where the last constituent
element of the offence had occurred (objective or terminatory principle), or where
the detrimental effects of the offence were felt? The territorial principle could also
mean the place where any element of the offence occurred. Since article 22.1 does
not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised by a party in accordance with its
domestic law, the territorial principle could be interpreted to mean the state which
has a reasonable and legitimate interest in taking jurisdiction or the state which has
a real and substantial link with the offence and the offender.119 Since the effects of
a cyber attack would be felt in the territory of the targeted state, any of the bases for
exercising jurisdiction pursuant to the territorial principle could be used except the
subjective or initiatory principle.
Second, the Convention lists the active nationality principle, which bases ju-
risdiction on the nationality of the offender provided the offence is punishable
116 Criminal Code, supra note 93, s 83(23).
117 In Canada, Criminal Code, ibid, s 6(2). As a general rule no person shall be convicted
of an offence committed outside Canada.
118 Supra note 85, art 22.1, a, b, c.
119 In Canada see R. v. Libman, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178 (jurisdiction where a substantial por-
tion of the activities has taken place in Canada).
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under the criminal law where it was committed or if the offence was committed
outside the territorial jurisdiction of any state.120 Canada uses the principle of ac-
tive nationality sparingly.121
Unlike Canadian legislation,122 the Convention does not mention the passive
personality principle based on the nationality of the victim. On the other hand, a
state victim of a cyber attack should be able to use the protective principle to estab-
lish its jurisdiction over the offender since such attack would be prejudicial to its
security and economic well-being.123 The universal principle should also enable
states to exercise jurisdiction over terrorists committing cyber offences — espe-
cially where extradition of the offenders is not possible and there are no other bases
for the exercise of jurisdiction.
Canadian legislation complies with the provisions of the Convention dealing
with jurisdiction.124 It also enables Canadian courts to assert extra territorial juris-
diction over cyber crimes and some of its non-state actors.125 However, assertions
of extra-territorial jurisdiction may result in disproportionate distribution of Internet
regulation which would allow the state that prescribes the most stringent laws to
prevail. The effects doctrine would limit such assertion and give the strongest claim
to the state that felt the most substantial effects of a cyber attack.
(e) Extradition
The Convention on Cybercrime contains provisions dealing with the extradi-
tion of individuals who have committed the cyber offences listed therein “provided
they are punishable under the laws of both Parties concerned by deprivation of lib-
erty for a maximum period of at least one year, or by a more severe penalty.”126
These extraditable offences are deemed to be included in any existing extradition
treaties between the parties to the Convention. Since many states will not extradite
their nationals, the Convention on Cybercrime provides that if the extradition is
refused solely on the basis of the nationality of the person sought, or because the
state has jurisdiction over the offence, the requested state shall submit the case at
the request of the requesting state to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution.127 With respect to terrorists, the political offence exception could be a
barrier to their extradition since the Convention on Cybercrime provides that “Ex-
tradition shall be subject to the conditions provided by the law of the requested
120 Supra note 85, art 22.1.d.
121 Criminal Code, supra note 93, ss 46(3), 7(2.3), 7(3,7)(c), 7(3.71)(c), 7(3)(c), 7
(3.1)(c)(i), 7(3.5)(c), 7(3.7)(c), 7(3.72)(c)(i), 7(3.73)(c)(i), 7(3.74)(a). In general, see
JG Castel, “The Internet in Light of Traditional Public and private International Law
Principles and Rules Applied in Canada” (2001), 39 Can YB Int’l L 3 at 9–22.
122 Criminal Code, ibid, ss 7(2.31)(a), 7(2.1)(f), 7(3.1)(e), 7(3.71), 7(3.72)(e), 7(3.75).
123 Criminal Code, ibid, ss 7(2.1)(g), 7 (2.31)(b), 7 (3.1)(d), 7(3.72)(f), 7(3.73)(e),
7(3.75)(b),(c).
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid, ss 83.01(1), (Definitions, “terrorist activity” (a) and (b); 7(3.74), and 7(3.75)).
126 Supra note 85, art 24.
127 Ibid, art 24.6.
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Party or by applicable extradition treaties, including the grounds on which the re-
quested Party may refuse extradition.”128 However, modern extradition treaties
have eliminated this exception and replaced it with a humanitarian exception to
allow the accused to claim that he or she will not receive a fair trial in the request-
ing state. This is not the case in Canada where the Extradition Act provides that the
Minister shall refuse to make a surrender if “the conduct in respect of which extra-
dition is sought is a political offence or an offence of a political character,”129 ex-
cept in the case of a person subject to a request for surrender issued by the Interna-
tional Criminal Court.130 However, some conduct such as murder, extortion, using
devices in circumstances in which human life is likely to be endangered or property
damage is likely to be caused, does not constitute a political offence or an offence
of a political character.131 This provision would cover a cyber attack if it is an
offence included in the relevant extradition treaty. To overcome these barriers to
extradition many states have used other methods such as exclusion, deportation or
rendition of the accused.
Once the accused is before the courts of the requesting state, treaties of mutual
assistance in criminal matters are designed to help the prosecution gather the evi-
dence necessary for obtaining a conviction.132
In the absence of a treaty of extradition, the requested state would be under no
obligation to extradite the offender found in its territory. For states that are not
parties to the Convention on Cybercrime extradition would depend on the treaties
in existence between the states concerned.
As with state perpetrators, the greatest difficulty is identifying and locating the
actor of the cyber attack, whether a private individual or a terrorist, for the purpose
of prosecution or extradition, as some states may not be properly knowledgeable or
equipped to do so.
CONCLUSIONS
Global security in cyberspace is an absolute necessity given the global nature
of the Internet. Preventing and stopping a cyber attack, especially against the criti-
cal infrastructures of a particular state, requires the co-operation and assistance of
all states in the investigation of such attack and in blocking all traffic with the
offending state Internet Service Providers. Multilateral responses are necessary as
they are in other situations involving threats to international peace and security.
Cyber attacks are a global problem like global warming, because no one state can
deal adequately with the problem on its own.133 Existing customary and conven-
128 Ibid, art 24.5. For political offences see S Williams & JG Castel, Canadian Criminal
Law. International and Transnational Aspects (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981) at
347–378.
129 SC 1999, c 18, s 46 (1)(c).
130 Ibid, s 47.1.
131 Ibid, s 46(2).
132 For instance, Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 85, arts 25–35.
133 HH Perritt Jr “The Internet as a Threat to Sovereignty? Thoughts on the Internet’s Role
in Strengthening National and Global Government” (1998) 5 Ind J Global Legal Stud
423 at 429.
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tional international law rules are not as clear and effective when applied to a cyber
attack by an organ or agent of a state or by its sponsored terrorist organizations as
when applied to a cyber attack by a non-state actor. Simply reaffirming the applica-
bility of present international law rules to cyber attacks is not sufficient. Some gaps
and uncertainties still exist in their application which must be addressed due to the
fact that cyber warfare is of very recent origin. However, it will not be easy to
change present international law rules to reflect the interests and desires of a signif-
icant number of states especially those of the United States of America, China and
Russia. Any new international law rules will have to achieve a suitable balance
between the threats and opportunities cyberspace creates.
With respect to cyber attacks as cyber crimes by non-state actors including
terrorists, the present legal situation is much better since an ever increasing number
of states have implemented the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime,
which so far has proven to be reasonably effective. A global solution is in sight.
However, there is still room for improvement on the Canadian domestic level.
It is worth considering a number of possible solutions which could be adopted
at the international and Canadian levels.
(a) On the International Level
To adapt international law rules to this new form of nefarious cyber activity,
states could:
1. Clarify the notion of use of force in article 2 paragraph 4 of the Char-
ter of the United Nations by having this body declare that it includes
cyber attacks. This finds support in the advisory opinion of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in the nuclear weapons case;134 or
2. Amend the definition of aggression to include cyber attacks by states
or sponsored by them without being preceded by or accompanied by
physical armed attacks. This would enable the Security Council to inter-
vene pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and
the International Criminal Court to exercise jurisdiction when authorized
to do so by the Security Council, pursuant to article 5.1(d), which lists the
crime of aggression as defined in article 8 bis adopted on 11 June 2010.
This amendment would not affect the concept of self-defence. However,
it may be considered unnecessary by the U.S.A., which recently empha-
sized in its Declaration of an International Strategy for Cyberspace that:
“Consistent with the United Nations Charter, states have an inherent right
to self — defense that may be triggered by certain aggressive acts in
cyberspace.”135 or
3. Adopt a multilateral or bilateral Convention on Cyber Space prohibit-
ing states from resorting to cyber attacks on the Internet and other com-
puter networks as the international community has done with respect to
other weapons in the Geneva Gas Protocol prohibiting the use in war of
134 Supra note 24.
135 Supra note 10.
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poisonous gases,136 the Biological Weapons Convention,137 and the
Chemical Weapons Convention.138 The convention could be limited in
scope to cyber attacks most seriously endangering the security of states
and their economic well-being; for instance, banning cyber attacks
against financial institutions such as altering data or damaging their net-
works through logic bombs. More generally, the convention could ban
cyber attacks against all civilian infrastructures except in case of self-
defence; and
4. Due to the unique aspects of cyberspace, clarify its impact on the law
of armed conflict and ban or limit cyber attacks by adding a Protocol to
that effect to the 1980 Convention on Prohibition or Restriction on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons and Protocols;139 and amend the
Geneva Conventions and Protocols accordingly;140 and
5. Monitor compliance by international inspection teams for which an In-
ternational Cyber Forensics and Compliance Body under the auspices of
the United Nations would be created similar to those in the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons whose signatory states have con-
cluded agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency with re-
spect to compliance141 or the Chemical Weapons Convention.142 Flow
monitoring devices could be placed at key nodes leading into the net-
works of states to watch how the traffic moves and to look for unusual
patterns in order to detect the origin of the attack. The sanctions for
breaching such conventions would be to limit or prevent the international
Internet and telephone traffic flows into the offending state thus denying
service to legal entities, persons, state agencies and devices participating
in an attack. Monitoring compliance is important as the value of an inter-
national convention to ban or limit cyber attacks would depend upon de-
tecting violations. This is not easy since a cyber attack by state A against
state B can come from a botnet computer in state C. Even if a state admit-
ted that an attack came from a hacker in its territory, it could claim that
such attack was the act of an anonymous citizen. National cyberspace
accountability is difficult to establish.
6. If options 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 are not possible at the present time, a new
customary international law rule could be developed by a majority of
states by categorizing a cyber attack by or sponsored by a state as an act
of war depending upon the circumstances and effects of such attack.
7. Create a multilateral International Standing Emergency Response
136 (1925) 94 LNTS 565, (1975) 14 ILM 49.
137 (1972) 26 USTS 583, (1972) 11 ILM 310.
138 (1993) 32 ILM 800.
139 Supra note 65.
140 Supra notes 66, 67, 68.
141 Art II, online: <http://www.state.gov./www/global/arms/treaties/npt1.html>.
142 See supra note 138.
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Body;143 and
8. Create an International Cyber Reduction Risk Center with obligation to
assist targeted states; and
9. Become a party to the Convention on Cybercrime,144 and include a
cyber attack as an offense in the domestic criminal legislation; and try to
provide penalties similar to those prevailing in the other member states;
and
10. Become a party to conventions of mutual legal assistance in criminal
matters that cover cyber crimes by providing information and evidence to
facilitate finding, prosecuting and punishing those responsible for such
crimes; and
11. Include cyber crimes in treaties of extradition and remove the politi-
cal offence exception from the treaties that still contain this exception;
and
12. Modify the scope of the international law rules pertaining to state
immunity by removing the immunity from jurisdiction of states resorting
to or sponsoring terrorism.
Some states have already adopted some of these proposals. However, as al-
ready mentioned, regulation of the Internet to prevent cyber attacks is a transna-
tional problem that must receive global support.
(b) On the National Level in Canada
On the national level, Canada could take the following steps to reduce its vul-
nerability to cyber attacks:
1. Participate actively in the adoption of new international law rules with
respect to cyber attacks on the international level as proposed above.
2. With respect to cyber attacks by state actors, adopt the U.S. categoriza-
tion of such attacks as acts of war until clarified by the Security Council.
3. Implement as soon as possible Canada’s Cyber Security Strategy.145
4. Adopt legislation to implement the provisions of the Convention on
Cybercrime which are not yet part of the existing federal legislation to
enable Canada to ratify it. In the last Parliament the government had in-
troduced three Bills146 for this purpose one of which has already been be
143 See for instance, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence in Estonia
created in 2008 following the 2007 Cyber attack on that country’s public and private
institutions.
144 Supra note 85.
145 Supra note 18.
146 40th Parliament: Bill C-50, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (Interception of Pri-
vate Communications and Related Warrants and Orders); Bill C-51, An Act to amend
the Criminal Code, the Competition Act and the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters Act (Investigative Powers for the 21st Century Act); Bill C-52; An Act regulat-
ing telecommunications facilities to support investigations (Investigating and Prevent-
ing Criminal Electronic Communications Act).
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re-introduced and adopted by the 41st Parliament and is now before the
Senate for final approval.147 The others will probably be re-introduced
soon. The most important provisions of these bills from the point of view
of cyber crimes deal with improved access to investigative tools includ-
ing: the extension of the maximum period for the use of tracking devices
in investigations of terrorism; tracing communications back to a suspect;
making it illegal to possess a computer virus for the purpose of commit-
ting an offence of mischief and importing and making available a com-
puter virus; enhancing international co-operation to help in investigating
and prosecuting cyber crimes that go beyond Canada’s borders; and, the
obligation of telecommunications service providers to put in place and
maintain devices that facilitate the lawful interception of information
transmitted by telecommunications to be supplied to police and security
intelligence services including basic information about their subscribers.
5. Resort to unilateral measures such as the use of active defenses by the
Canadian system administrator who, having traced the source of the at-
tack using trace programs, would back hack and disrupt it, in the absence
of specific international instruments relating to the enforcement of data
protection laws with states which are not parties to the Cybercrime Con-
vention or in case of refusal to cooperate. This solution may be an appro-
priately forceful response to a cyber attack whether by a state or a non-
state actor. Another solution would be cyber deterrence by way of coun-
termeasures against the attacker network. It would not amount to cyber
war and could be justified as a countermeasure if the attack was by a state
actor.
6. Create a national cyber attack early warning system whether or not
such attack is politically motivated.
7. Create a Cyber Command similar to the one existing in other states,
notably in the United State of America. It could be in charge of running
the early warning system.
8. As proposed by Canada’s Cyber Security Strategy, fix the vulnerability
of the Canadian power grid, banking system and other civilian networks.
To reduce Canada’s vulnerability to cyber attacks on her infrastructures
is not easy as the critical infrastructure networks pertaining to electric-
ity,148 banking, manufacturing, transportation, etc., are all connected to
the Internet. A solution would be to keep these networks separate from
the Internet and secure. To do so would minimize and even eliminate any
interruption and manipulations of Canada’s critical functions thereby
avoiding any concerted attack on the computers of an important sector of
147 Bill C-10, supra note 45, (deals with the recourse available to victims of terrorism
against terrorists and those sponsoring them).
148 In the USA see David M Nicol, “Hacking the Lights Out” (July 2011) The Scientific
American 70. Also, “Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for the Power Grid” Multi-
university research project funded by the U.S. Department of Energy, online:
<www.tcipg.org>.
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the Canadian economy.
9. Adopt federal regulations pursuant to Canada’s Cyber Security Strat-
egy and proposed legislation,149 to create cyber security requirements for
the large Internet Service Providers operating in Canada forcing them to
engage in deep packet inspection at line rate speed with no latency or by
flow analysis to identify the signature of the malware. This could be done
automatically. Again the difficulty may come from the fact that the pack-
ets may be routed through a state that is not the source of the attack. In
China, for instance, the government actively defends the network. In
Canada and the United States of America, this is not yet the case because
cyber connections are privately owned and operated. The Canadian gov-
ernment cannot disconnect the entire nation’s network from the rest of
cyberspace to stop malware and prevent a “Distributed Denial of Ser-
vice.” Federal regulation of the network even for reasons of security has
to be limited for fear of violating privacy issues and the freedom of opin-
ion and expression including media of communication guaranteed by the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.150 The best solution would be
a federal government widely integrated cyber security program that in-
cluded standards for private companies. Canada could also require In-
ternet Service Providers to deny service to actors who participate in cyber
attacks and to report them to the authorities and black list them in the
future.151
Over the centuries, international law has evolved in order to keep up with new
methods of human interaction on land, sea, air, outer space and, more recently
cyberspace. With the end of the outer space age,152 the international regulation of
cyberspace has become what one could describe as the final frontier and one the
greatest challenges of the 21st century. 
149 See Bill C-51, supra note 146.
150 Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to Canada Act 1982, (UK), 1982, c 11, s 2(b) (fun-
damental freedoms).
151 The basis for federal legislation over the Internet and cyberspace could be based on the
opening words of s 91 (power of the Parliament over the Peace, Order, and good Gov-
ernment of Canada) and ss 91(29) and 92(10)(a) and (c) (by reason of the nature of the
service provided by the Internet) Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vic, c 3.
152 “It is equally quite conceivable that the fantasy-made-reality of human space flight will
return to fantasy. It is likely that the Space Age is over.” See “The End of the Space
Age”, The Economist 400:8740 (7 July 2011) 7.
